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Key take-aways
KEY TAKE-AWAYS
The 2021 opium harvest, completed in July, marked the fifth year in a row with 
production at historic highs of more than 6,000 tons, potentially yielding up to 
320 tons of pure heroin to be trafficked to markets around the world. 
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Income from opiates in Afghanistan amounted to some $1.8-$2.7 billion in 2021. 
However, much larger sums are accrued along illicit drug supply chains outside 
Afghanistan. Taxes on opiates cultivation, production and trafficking represent a 
lucrative potential source of financing for non-state actors in the country.
Income from opiates
 in Afghanistan
  
1.8 - 2.7 
billion dollars
in 2021
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Key take-aways
Shifting trends in opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan have 
far-reaching impact on global illicit drug markets and organized criminal ac-
tivity. Afghanistan accounted for some 85 per cent of global opium production 
in 2020, supplying some 80% of all opiate users in the world.
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Key take-aways
Continued uncertainty since August 2021 has driven up opium prices in August and 
September and is increasing incentives for cultivation, just as the crisis exacerbates 
poverty and food insecurity, potentially leaving more people vulnerable to drug use 
disorders. The 2022 opium harvest will be based on decisions that farmers will make 
in November 2021, when they are starting to sow opium poppy.
 2,000
 4,000
 6,000
 8,000
 10,000
 12,000
 14,000
 16,000
 18,000
 20,000
 -
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 Produc�on  Simple average
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Low production
in 2015, leading 
to high prices in 
2016/2017
Decrease in 
prices due to 
increased 
production
Sudden increase 
in prices after 
mid-August 2021
US
  d
ol
la
rs
 p
er
 ki
lo
gr
am
to
ns
2011 Price hike 
due to a failed 
harvest in 2010
Opium production and average farm-gate price of opium
6 11/2021
Key take-aways
Increased 
production
Increased seizures 
inside and outside 
Afghanistan
Increased
use
The illicit drug economy has become increasingly complex, with methamphetamine 
manufacture in Afghanistan sharply increasing in recent years. High regional and 
global demand for methamphetamine, coupled with a saturated market for opiates, 
could push further expansion of manufacture of methamphetamine and other  
synthetic drugs.
Methamphetamines from Afghanistan: 
the emerging of a global threath
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Key take-aways
IN VIEW OF THE VOLATILE SECURITY SITUATION, PROTRACTED  
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND HEALTH EMERGENCY, THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY MUST URGENTLY PROVIDE BASIC NEEDS AND SERVICES 
TO THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN TO PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE  
REDUCTIONS IN ILLICIT DRUG CULTIVATION, PRODUCTION AND  
DEMAND AS PART OF OVERALL UN ASSISTANCE.
The loss of development assistance might 
be offset by increased illegal activities 
$
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Shrinking of the licit economy can make drug markets 
a larger share of the national economy
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Key take-aways
DATA SOURCES
Information and data contained in this brief, unless other-
wise stated, are based on data collected by UNODC through 
surveys and other tools in Afghanistan and through global 
data collections on drugs− the Annual Report Questionnaire 
(ARQ) and the Drugs Monitoring Platform (DMP). In partic-
ular, data on opium cultivation and production are based 
on the Afghanistan Opium Survey 1994-2020 published by 
UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as the 
latest findings of the Afghanistan Opium Survey conducted 
in 2021. Data on cannabis cultivation and production are 
based on the Afghanistan Survey of Commercial Cannabis 
Cultivation Production 2012 (UNODC and Government of 
Afghanistan 2013). Data on drug trafficking are based on the 
ARQ and the DMP.
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Opium production remains at high levels and  constitutes an important pillar of Afghanistan’s economy
OPIUM PRODUCTION REMAINS AT HIGH LEVELS AND  
CONSTITUTES AN IMPORTANT PILLAR OF AFGHANISTAN’S 
ECONOMY
The production of opiates (opium, morphine, and heroin) 
is arguably Afghanistan’s largest illegal economic activity. 
The gross output of the Afghan illicit opiate economy was 
estimated to be $1.8-$2.7 billion in 2021. The total value 
of opiates, including domestic consumption and exports, 
stood at between 9 to 14 per cent of Afghanistan’s GDP, 
exceeding the value of its officially recorded licit exports 
of goods and services (estimated at 9 per cent of GDP in 
2020).1 
At the end of the annual opium cultivation season in July 
2021, the area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghan-
istan was estimated at 177,000 hectares. This was a 21 
per cent decrease from 2020, representing a contraction 
of 47,000 hectares. Opium poppy cultivation has been 
increasing steadily over the past two decades, with an 
average rise of 4,000 hectares each year since systematic 
monitoring began in 1994 – albeit with strong yearly fluc-
tuations. 
The 2021 decrease in cultivation was offset by an 
increase in opium yield per hectare. Estimated opium  
production in 2021 was 6,800 tons or 8 per cent more 
than in 2020, meaning production has exceeded 6,000 
tons for an unprecedented fifth consecutive year. This 
amount of opium could be converted into some 270-320 
tons of pure heroin.
In some regions, opium poppy cultivation occupied a sig-
nificant proportion of the overall agricultural land. For 
example, in Hilmand province 20 per cent of the land was 
dedicated to opium poppy, and in some districts the pro-
portion was even higher. Opium poppy took away land 
from vitally important food crops including wheat. In its 
latest country assessment in July 2021, FAO predicted a 
below average cereal harvest, mainly because of below 
average production of rainfed crops in western, south-
western and southern areas. These regions have suffered 
from unfavourable weather conditions and a lack of agri-
cultural inputs. Cereal production for 2021 was forecasted 
at 4.6 million tons, about 20 per cent lower than 2020 
1 National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA) of the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
levels.2 Afghanistan is not food self-sufficient, – cereal 
imports have been almost as high as domestic production 
for the past five years.3 Current shortages of US dollars 
and other foreign currencies prevent traders from mak-
ing payments, affecting the availability of imports.4 Food 
prices have increased, and many Afghans are facing food 
insecurity.5
Sustained high levels of production may have saturated 
the opium market, as average farm-gate prices at the 2021 
harvest time remained very low. However, there was a dra-
matic spike in August 2021 – prices doubled from May 
2021 levels – as an immediate reaction to the changed 
2 UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). July 15, 2021. Global Infor-
mation and Early Warning Systems. Country Briefs. Afghanistan. Accessed: 
November 07, 2021 https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.
jsp?code=AFG&lang=en. 
3	 The	latest	FAO’s	official	cereal	import	dependency	ratio	(3-year	average,	
2016-2018) for Afghanistan is 41 per cent (meaning 41 per cent of all the 
cereal	consumed	in	Afghanistan	is	imported).	No	official	data	available	for	
the period 2019-2021 (see FAO. Suite of Food Security Indicators. Afghani-
stan. Accessed November 07, 2021 https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/
FS .)
4 The World Bank. The World Bank in Afghanistan. Overview. Country Con-
text. Accessed: November 07, 2021 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
afghanistan/overview#1.
5 UN World Food Program (WFP). Afghanistan Emergency. Accessed: Novem-
ber 07, 2021 https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/afghanistan-emergency. 
FIG. 1: Afghanistan opium cultivation (ha), 1994–2021
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Opium production remains at high levels and constitutes an important pillar of Afghanistan’s economy
political situation. This may have been an indica-
tion of uncertainty over the future of the market 
rather than a shortage of opium. The situation 
stabilized during the following month but prices 
remained at higher levels than before August, 
which may have implications for the next growing 
season. Planting starts in November and prices 
considerably higher than other crops can be an 
incentive to cultivate opium. 
Opium poppy secures the  
livelihoods of many Afghans. In 2019, for 
example, opium poppy was cultivated in 
about a third of rural villages in Afghani-
stan and created the equivalent of roughly 
190,700 full-time jobs.
MAP 1: Density of opium poppy cultivation in agricultural land in Afghanistan as proportion of agricultural land  
used for opium poppy cultivation, 2021
The boundaries and names shown and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.Dotted 
line represents approximately the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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Dotted line represents approximately the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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FIG. 2: Opium production and average farm-gate prices of opium, 
2006–2021
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Afghanistan’s drug economy extends beyond  opium: methamphetamine and cannabis
AFGHANISTAN’S DRUG ECONOMY EXTENDS BEYOND  
OPIUM: METHAMPHETAMINE AND CANNABIS 
The expansion of methamphetamine manufacture 
in recent years has added another layer of complex-
ity to the illicit drug economy of Afghanistan and has 
increased the threat to countries in the region and 
beyond. 
Seizures inside and outside the country point to a sharp 
increase in methamphetamine manufacture in Afghani-
stan during the last few years. An analysis of significant 
individual drug seizures shows that an increasing per-
centage of methamphetamine seized in neighbouring 
countries originated in Afghanistan between the periods 
2014-2018 and 2019-2021. This indicates that Afghan 
traffickers were able to capture an increasing share of the 
methamphetamine market in the region and beyond. Sei-
zures within Afghanistan also reflect the expansion of the 
methamphetamine market. In 2020, methamphetamine 
seizures made up a notable share of total weight of seized 
drugs in many provinces.
In most Asian countries, methamphetamine manufac-
ture largely relies on synthetic pseudoephedrine or ephed-
rine as precursors.1 But most reports from Afghanistan 
suggest there has been a shift from imported over-the-
counter (OTC) pseudoephedrine preparations to the ephe-
dra plant2, which grows wild in the country.3, 4 By 2018, 
most of the methamphetamine in Afghanistan was report-
edly produced using ephedra.5 However, the plants are 
bulky and it has been speculated that they may not be 
sustainable for large production. If this holds true, syn-
thetic precursors may once again become more attrac-
tive.
An open question remains whether methamphetamine 
manufacture will evolve as complementary to the opiate 
economy or as a substitute, to the point of displacing opi-
ate production. Methamphetamine production is concen-
trated in western parts of the country and there is little 
overlap with opium cultivation. There are also no apparent 
strong geographical links between opium cultivation and 
ephedra availability.6 But the situation may be different at 
the trafficking level. Methamphetamine has been seized 
with heroin in Kandahar in the south and Nangarhar in the 
east, suggesting that trafficking in the two drugs may be 
done by the same networks.7 This highlights the potential 
for methamphetamine to become a substitute for opiates 
– and vice versa – in response to changes in the market. 
Afghanistan is a major producer of cannabis resin 
(‘hashish’). It is the second country most frequently 
reported as the origin of seized cannabis resin world-
wide, accounting for 18 per cent of all reports on the main 
“country of origin” in the period 2015–2019.8 
1 UNODC, World Drug Report 2021.
2 EMCDDA, EU4MD SPECIAL REPORT, Methamphetamine from Afghanistan: 
signals indicate that Europe should be better prepared, (Lisbon, September 
2021). 
3 EMCDDA, Emerging evidence of Afghanistan’s role as a producer and sup-
plier of methamphetamine, (Lisbon, November 2020).
4 UNDARK, The Wild Shrub at the Root of the Afghan Meth Epidemic (20 May 
2020).
5 Lynzy Billing, “Afghanistan’s crystal meth boom is rooted in this plant – A 
shift to making the illicit drug from ephedra has caused output to soar”, 
Chemical and Engineering News, (Volume 99, Issue 132, April 22, 2021).
6 The ephedra plant grows in the mountainous central highlands, typically at 
an altitude of over 2,500 meters – which contrasts poppy cultivation, which 
can be cultivated in virtually all parts of the country where there is agricul-
tural land.
7 UNODC, Drugs Monitoring Platform, 2020. 
8 While cannabis herb is widely cultivated and sold in virtually all countries, 
the production of cannabis resin is more concentrated in a few countries 
(UNODC, World Drug Report 2021, Booklet 3). 
FIG. 3: Methamphetamine seizures in Afghanistan 
2012–2020
Source: Ministry of Interior Affairs, Counternarcotics Police of Afghani-
stan Tactical Operations Centre (TOC) Daily Report.
Note: The data reported are based upon the presumptive identification 
results and weights obtained at the time of seizure (the exact weights and 
materials present can only be established by laboratory analysis).
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Afghanistan’s drug economy extends beyond  opium: methamphetamine and cannabis
FIG. 4: Main countries of origin of seized cannabis resin, 
as reported by Member States, 2015–2019
Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2021. 
MAP 2: Opium poppy cultivation by district (left), and districts where methamphetamine production has been reported 
(right), 2021
The boundaries and names shown and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted 
line represents approximately the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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FIG. 5: Methamphetamine, heroin and opium seizures (kg) in 
Kabul, October 2019–November 2020
Source: UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform.
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Afghanistan’s drug economy extends beyond opium: methamphetamine and cannabis
Between 2009 and 2012, UNODC, jointly with the Afghan 
Ministry for Counter Narcotics, conducted annual sur-
veys on commercial cannabis production in Afghanistan. 
The 2012 survey estimated the total area under cannabis 
cultivation at 10,000 hectares, enough to produce 1,400 
tons of cannabis resin. These figures only included com-
mercial, mono-crop cannabis cultivation and did not cap-
ture small-scale “kitchen garden” cultivation of cannabis. 
In 2012, farmers potentially achieved a gross income of 
$6,400 per hectare from cannabis resin, which was higher 
than the gross income from opium ($4,600 per hectare 
in that year). Updating the 2012 survey information with 
the latest available price data in 2021 shows that canna-
bis remains more profitable than opium.9 However there 
is no indication that the extent of cannabis cultivation has 
become larger than opium cultivation. Reasons are not 
clear, this may relate to issues such as different levels of 
international demand and land management, or other.
9 Calculation based on cannabis resin prices for May 2021, cannabis yield 
data from the 2012 Cannabis Cultivation Survey, and 2021 income per hect-
are for opium.
Cannabis cultivation was found to be linked to opium 
poppy cultivation. In 2011, when the last dedicated can-
nabis village survey took place, 58 per cent of canna-
bis-growing households reported also cultivating poppy. 
Moreover, historical price data showed that cannabis 
prices and opium prices were strongly correlated. How-
ever, the link has lost some of its importance over the past 
five years, which may point to a smaller overlap between 
cannabis and opium markets inside Afghanistan.
Cannabis is financially attractive:  
with latest available prices (2021), income from cannabis resin  
amounted to up to $7,400/ha while income from opium amounted to $2,200/ha.
Cannabis cultivation in Afghanistan 
14 11/2021
Drugs of Afghan origin reach regional and  global markets
DRUGS OF AFGHAN ORIGIN REACH REGIONAL AND  
GLOBAL MARKETS
Accounting for an estimated 85 per cent of global opium 
production in 2020, opium produced in Afghanistan sup-
plies heroin to large consumption markets in neighbour-
ing countries, Europe, the Near and Middle East, South 
Asia, and Africa. It reaches destinations as far as North 
America (notably Canada) and Oceania. Opiates of Afghan 
origin supply roughly 25 million users around the globe, 
or about 80 per cent of all users in the world.1 Close to 
1 Calculations based on the World Drug Report 2021, Fig 74, booklet 3, and 
Table 4 in the Annex of booklet 3.
4 million regular opiate users reside within South West 
Asia.2 Changes in the opiate market in Afghanistan have 
far-reaching consequences for trafficking activities and 
illicit financial flows related to opiate trafficking and the 
use of heroin and opium. Considering the high level of 
dependence resulting from heroin use, any changes in 
the availability of heroin can have a major impact on drug 
users. 
2 Based on UNODC regional estimates of opiate users, World Drug Report 
2021.
MAP 3: Main trafficking flows of opiates originated in Afghanistan, 2015-2019
Sources: UNODC.
The size of the route is based on the total amount seized on that route, according to the information on trafficking routes provided by Member States in 
the annual report questionnaire, individual drug seizures and other official documents, over the 2015–2019 period. The routes are determined on the basis 
of reported country of departure/ transit and destination in these sources. As such, they need to be considered as broadly indicative of existing trafficking 
routes while several secondary routes may not be reflected. Route arrows represent the direction of trafficking: origins of the arrows indicate either the 
area of departure or the one of last provenance, end points of arrows indicate either the area of consumption or the one of next destination of trafficking. 
Therefore, the trafficking origin may not reflect the country in which the substance was produced. Please see the Methodology section of this document. 
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.  
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Drugs of Afghan origin reach regional and global markets
Regular users may react to shortages in heroin supply by 
switching to more harmful patterns of behaviour – using 
other opioids such as fentanyl and buprenorphine, stim-
ulants including amphetamines and NPS stimulants, and 
switching to injecting, with accompanying risks of HIV and 
hepatitis C infections.
Methamphetamine originating in Afghanistan has been 
reported over the period 2019 - 2021 in neighbouring Iran 
(Islamic Republic of) and Pakistan, Central Asia and Trans-
caucasia (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), and as 
far afield as Europe (Czechia and France), South-East Asia 
(Indonesia), South Asia (Sri Lanka), and Oceania (Austra-
lia). Some countries in Africa have also reported metham-
phetamine coming from South-West Asia that could have 
originated in Afghanistan. Trafficking has intensified and 
extended its geographical reach in the last few years. The 
joint trafficking of opiates and methamphetamine has the 
potential to push Afghan methamphetamine across con
tinents, benefiting from the wide reach of criminal net-
works already established for heroin trafficking inside and 
outside Afghanistan. This can develop or expand a sup-
ply-driven market of methamphetamine where demand is 
now limited, for example in Western, Central, and East-
ern Europe and in heroin transit regions such as East and 
Southern Africa, and South Asia.3 
3 UNODC, Drugs Monitoring Platform, 2020.
MAP 4: Significant seizures of methamphetamine in selected countries of the Near and Middle East/South-West Asia, 
South Asia, Central Asia, Caucasus and Turkey by origin, 2014–2018
Source: UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform.
The boundaries and names shown and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted 
line represents approximately the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
FIG. 6: Countries that have reported seizures of metham-
phetamine originating from Afghanistan between 
2019–2021The joint trafficking of opiates and  
methamphetamine poses a cross continental threat 
and may result in a supply-driven development of new 
methamphetamine markets
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Drugs of Afghan origin reach regional and global markets
Cannabis resin originating in Afghanistan has been found 
in neighbouring regions, but also in the Near and Middle 
East, in Central, Eastern, and Western Europe as well as in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus.4 
However, cannabis resin exports from Afghanistan to 
countries outside of South-West Asia appear to play only 
4 UNODC, responses to annual report questionnaire. 
a secondary role in many of these markets. Western and 
Central European markets receive their supply predom-
inantly from North Africa, and markets in the Near and 
Middle East and in Central Asia are supplied by production 
within the respective regions.
MAP 6: Countries reporting Afghanistan as source of seized cannabis resin, 2015–2019
Source: ARQ.
MAP 5: Significant seizures of methamphetamine in selected countries of the Near and Middle East/South-West Asia, 
South Asia, Central Asia, Caucasus and Turkey by origin, January 2019–September 2021
Source: UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform.
The boundaries and names shown and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted 
line represents approximately the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties.
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Drug production and trafficking bring financial benefits to a multitude of actors
DRUG PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING BRING FINANCIAL 
BENEFITS TO A MULTITUDE OF ACTORS
From cultivation and production to local distribution and 
international trade, all activities related to drug supply 
chains yield financial benefits for those involved. 
The largest share of Afghan income from opiates is 
accrued by the manufacture and international export  
($1.7 to $2.5 billion in 2021). The domestic use market 
($43 million in 2021) and the income made by farmers 
($425 million in 2021) are much smaller.
Non-state actors have benefited from opiates. In 2019, 
more than one-third of headmen in poppy villages 
reported to the UNODC village survey that their farmers 
paid taxes to non-state actors of roughly 6 per cent on 
sales of opium. Tax rates varied widely, with most values 
reported being between 2 and 10 per cent of the sales 
value. In 2019 (latest available data), this corresponded to 
roughly $14.5 million paid in taxes on opium by farmers. 
If the revenues from manufacturing and trafficking of opi-
ates were taxed in the same way, it could have yielded a 
total of $61 – $113 million for non-state actors in 2019. 
Although some Afghan traffickers have been arrested in 
Europe, most Afghans linked to large heroin seizures oper-
ate in and around their own country. This suggests other 
groups engage in bulk heroin trafficking across regions 
and continents.1 Trafficking profits that remain in the 
country represent only a small fraction of the profits made 
1 UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform Brief: The reach of nationally linked traf-
ficking groups across Afghan opiate trafficking routes (September 2021).
FIG. 7: Income from opiates in Afghanistan by activity 
(2021)
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outside Afghanistan in the markets where Afghan heroin 
is consumed. For example, the total monetary value of 
illicit opiates trafficked on the Balkan route amounted to 
an average of $28 billion each year in 2009-2012.2 The Bal-
kan route accounts for only a share of all the opiates traf-
ficked from Afghanistan, but this sum was still roughly a 
third higher than Afghanistan’s annual GDP ($21.2 billion 
in 2014). 
2 UNODC, Drug money: the illicit proceeds of opiates trafficked on the Balkan 
route (Vienna, 2015).
MAP 7: Nine most common traffickers by nationality involved in individual heroin seizures according to distance from 
Afghanistan and level of trafficking, January 2018–March 2021
Source: UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform.
The boundaries and names shown and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted 
line represents approximately the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has 
not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined.
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ILLICIT CULTIVATION IS DRIVEN BY SOCIOECONOMIC AND 
SECURITY-RELATED FACTORS
The cultivation of opium poppy is driven by many socio-
economic and security-related factors, including multi-di-
mensional poverty, lack of licit economic opportunities, 
and limited access to markets. Most of the farmers who 
cultivate opium poppy live in villages with lower qual-
ity infrastructure, and with less advantaged living condi-
tions. Opium poppy villages tend to have less access than 
non-poppy villages to functioning public electricity grids, 
schools, literacy programs, and agricultural cooperatives. 
In addition, farmers in opium poppy villages have on aver-
age 40 per cent les available agricultural land and face 20 
per cent longer journeys to markets for selling legal crops, 
as well as 23 per cent more road closures each year 
owing to security conditions.1
1 Based on a UNODC needs assessment survey conducted with 16,000 
households in 13 provinces in Afghanistan in 2017; and national annual 
rural socioeconomic surveys (2018-2020).
Opium farmers showed higher multi-dimensional poverty 
and economic vulnerability than farmers not cultivating 
opium poppy. Factors associated with opium poppy cul-
tivation include lower earnings from legal crops, higher 
number of household members, lower crop and income 
diversification, and less access to credit.2
Opium farmers also face higher levels of insecurity and 
distrust than farmers not engaging in opium poppy culti-
vation. Those cultivating opium poppy had a 14 per cent 
lower perception of unity among the members of their 
community, 13 per cent lower trust in their neighbours, 20 
per cent lower levels of confidence that authorities (state 
and non-state) could protect the citizen and guard them 
against corruption and 12 per cent higher levels of feeling 
unsafe than those not cultivating opium poppy. This asso-
ciation is even more pronounced for the small percentage 
of female-headed households (representing 5 per cent of 
all households). Female-headed households cultivating 
opium poppy showed even higher levels of insecurity and 
distrust than male-headed households cultivating opium 
poppy. 
2 Based on structural equation model results from the 2017 UNODC needs 
assessment survey for alternative development in 13 provinces in Afghani-
stan.
There is a strong association between opium poppy 
cultivation, deteriorating security and distrust of 
farmers towards communities and institutions. 
Female-headed households cultivating opium poppy 
showed even higher levels of insecurity and distrust 
than male-headed households.
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DRUG USE IN THE YOUNG POSES A CHALLENGE IN  
A COUNTRY WITH LIMITED DRUG TREATMENT OPTIONS
The past three decades of conflict and instability in 
Afghanistan have put considerable strain on traditional 
coping mechanisms and survival strategies. Displacement 
of populations within and outside the country has largely 
destroyed extended family structures and clans.1 Conse-
quently, the population has been left vulnerable to a wide 
range of mental health problems such as anxiety, depres-
sion, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) – com-
mon risk factors for initiation of drug use and development 
of drug use disorders.2
While use of drugs such as cannabis and opiates is well 
established in Afghanistan, the past decade has seen an 
expansion of the drug market with the production and use 
of synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine. Epidemi-
ological data on drug use in Afghanistan are patchy but 
what is clear is that drug use, notably opiate use, is among 
the highest in the world. Three national drug use surveys 
have been conducted since 2009, but their findings are not 
comparable since they covered different population groups 
1 UNODC and Government of Afghanistan, Drug use in Afghanistan: 2009  
survey (2009).
2 Joel Swendsen and others, “Mental disorders as risk factors for substance 
use, abuse and dependence: results from the 10-year follow-up of the 
National Comorbidity Survey”, Addiction, (2010) vol 105, no 6, pp 1117-
1128.
and employed different methodologies. In 2020 a survey 
was conducted among the young people,3 while in 20154, 
5 a survey was conducted among Afghan households and 
in 20096 a survey targeted adult regular drug users and key 
informants. 
Based on the surveys carried out in 2009 and 2015, it is 
likely that between 1 and 2 million Afghans use alcohol 
and drugs, including pharmaceutical drugs for non-med-
ical purposes. The national survey on drug use in 2009 
estimated that around 800,000 people had regularly used 
drugs (excluding alcohol) in the past year.7 The 2015 sur-
vey looked at the presence of drugs in biological samples 
of the survey participants, and estimated that between 1.9 
million and 2.3 million people had used alcohol and other 
3 UNODC, UNICEF and Government of Afghanistan, ‘Youth study on sub-
stance use and health’, Afghanistan 2020.
4 The Colombo Plan, “Afghanistan national drug use survey 2015”, imple-
mented with support of United States Department of State and the Govern-
ment of Afghanistan.
5 Owing to different methodologies the results of the 2009 and 2015 surveys 
cannot be compared or considered as showing a trend in drug use.
6 UNODC and Government of Afghanistan, ‘Drug use in Afghanistan: 2009 
survey”, 2009.
7 UNODC, Drug use in Afghanistan: 2009 survey: Executive summary. These 
estimates were based on interview with regular drug users and key infor-
mants in community settings and built on the number of drug users known 
by each category of the respondents.
FIG. 10: Security assessment by village headmen, by opium poppy cultivation status, 2019
Source: Needs assessment survey conducted by UNODC with 16,000 households in 13 provinces in Afghanistan in 2017.
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drugs in that year, including some medical use of opioids.8
The 2015 survey concluded that almost 31 per cent of the 
2,757 households sampled in the study had at least one 
person tested positive for one or more drugs. Overall, the 
percentage of population that tested positive for at least 
one drug was 11 per cent.9 
Cannabis and opiates (opium and, to a lesser extent, her-
oin) are the two most used substances in Afghanistan. 
Alongside opium production, opium use was especially 
widespread among the rural population in 2019. The prev-
alence of opiate use (2.7 per cent estimated in 2009) put 
Afghanistan among the countries with the highest preva-
lence of opiate use globally. 
Of particular concern in Afghanistan is the extent to which 
people using opium report giving opium to their children. In 
2009, for example, nearly 80 per cent of women who had 
used opium also reported giving opium to their children.10 
Similarly, biological samples from two-thirds of children in 
rural areas involved in the 2015 survey were found to con-
tain opium (metabolites), suggesting they had either been 
administered the drug, or “exposed” to it. 
In the absence of or lack of access to adequate health 
care services across the country, more so in the rural 
areas, some use of drugs in Afghanistan also occurs in 
the context of self-medication for treatment of physical 
ailments (common cough, cold, acute and chronic pain, 
etc)  as well as in case of psychological issues such as 
stress, anxiety, depression or trauma.
The use of cannabis and heroin is much higher among 
the adult male population than among females. In 2009 
for instance, around 8 per cent of males were estimated 
to have regularly used cannabis, compared with 0.2 per 
cent of females; and 1.6 per cent of males had regularly 
used heroin, compared with 0.2 per cent of females. The 
non-medical use of pharmaceutical opioids and tranquil-
lizers is also commonly reported among the adult pop-
ulation. However, unlike the use of traditional drugs, the 
non-medical use of tranquillizers is at comparable levels 
among men and women – a pattern observed in other 
parts of the world.11 In 2009, 0.4 per cent of both men and 
8 The Colombo Plan, “Afghanistan national drug use survey 2015”, imple-
mented with support of United States Department of State and the Govern-
ment of Afghanistan. These estimates were primarily based on the per cent 
of the population that tested positive for the presence of drugs in biolog-
ical samples (hair, urine, and/or saliva) as a result of active or intentional 
drug use. The biological samples were collected from people in randomly 
selected households in urban and rural areas. 
9 Ibid.
10 UNODC and Government of Afghanistan, ‘Drug use in Afghanistan: 2009 
survey”, 2009.
11  See for instance World Drug Report 2020.
women were estimated to be regular users of tranquilliz-
ers in Afghanistan. 
In recent years, the use of synthetic drugs such as meth-
amphetamine has also been increasingly reported in dif-
ferent assessments and in demands for treatment of 
drug use disorders.12 The most recent drug use survey in 
Afghanistan, conducted in 2020 among people aged 13-18 
years in 2019, showed considerable use of different drugs 
among school secondary students. Some 12 per cent (14 
per cent of boys and 8.5 per cent of girls) reported using 
any substance (including alcohol) at least once in the past 
12 months.13
Similar to the pattern observed among the adult population, 
the use of cannabis, heroin and opium was reported higher 
among boys than girls, whereas the use of tranquillizers or 
pharmaceutical opioids was at comparable levels.14 As an 
indication of the prevalence of synthetic drugs, past-year 
use of methamphetamine and Tablet K15 was at the same 
level as heroin among adolescents. Overall, 1.3 per cent of 
the students reported using heroin, the same percentage 
as used methamphetamine, with 1.8 per cent using Tablet 
K. In contrast to many other countries, there was no sig-
nificant difference in the extent of drug use among people 
aged 13-18 years between urban and rural areas. 
The school survey also showed that young adolescents 
were more likely to self-report drug use if they had smoked 
cigarettes in the past 12 months, had friends who used 
drugs, perceived lower risk from substance use, perceived 
easier availability of substances, did not disapprove of 
other people using drugs, skipped school without a med-
ical or valid reason, and displayed antisocial behaviours. 
These factors have all been observed in the literature on 
substance use among adolescents.16
12 UNODC, Afghanistan synthetic drugs situation assessment, 2017.
13 UNODC, UNICEF and Government of Afghanistan, Youth study on substance 
use and health (Afghanistan 2020).
14 The self-reported use of tranquillizers and pharmaceutical opioids included 
“for	medical	purposes”	though	it	was	not	well	defined.
15 “Tablet K” is the street name for a drug with (perceived) stimulant effects 
sold in Afghanistan. The name seems to be used for a range of tablet prod-
ucts sold on the drug market. It is possible that tablets sold under the street 
name “tablet K” contain methamphetamine, MDMA, or a range of other sub-
stances.
16 NIDA, “Preventing drug use among children and adolescents. A research-
based guide, 2nd edition”, Rockville, MD: Department of Health and Human 
More than ten per cent 
(11%) of the sampled  
population had tested positive for one or more drugs 
in 2015, with the rural population rate almost three 
times greater: 13% rural versus 5% urban
Services, National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Drug 
Abuse, 2003.
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FIG. 11: Share of opioid types among the  population groups that tested positive for at least one drug in Afghanistan, 
2015
Source: The Colombo Plan, “Afghanistan national drug use survey 2015”, implemented with support of United States Department of State and the 
Government of Afghanistan.
Note: These estimates are based on the per cent of the population that tested positive for the presence of drugs in biological samples (hair, urine, and/
or saliva) as a result of active or intentional drug use.  In case of samples that showed use of pharmaceutical opioids or those that contained codeine, it 
was difficult to determine their purpose. Some possible purposes in the use of codeine could have been in a medical context or in a non-medical context  
where codeine is available as one of by-products of heroin manufacturing that are sold as a low-grade form of opium, or other over-the-counter medica-
tions (e.g. cough syrups) containing codeine.
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FIG. 12: Self-reported use of drugs in the past year among secondary school students in Afghanistan, 2020 
Source: UNODC, UNICEF and Government of Afghanistan, ‘Youth study on 
substance use and health’, Afghanistan 2020.
Note: The use of opioid painkillers and tranquillizers includes possible 
medical and non-medical use.
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Outlook and future challenges
OUTLOOK AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
Afghanistan is in a state of constant crisis, with a precar-
ious economy and wider instability enabling illicit mar-
kets. Rapid reductions in international grant support, loss 
of access to offshore assets, and disruption of financial 
linkages are expected to lead to a major contraction of the 
economy, increasing poverty, and macroeconomic insta-
bility.1 Up to 97 per cent of the population is at risk of sink-
ing below the poverty line.2
This extreme situation comes after the COVID-19 pan-
demic and a string of atypical weather years, with severe 
drought being followed by high seasonal floods. Even 
before these difficulties, roughly 18 million Afghans – 
almost half of the population – needed aid. More than 
550,000 people have been displaced since January 2021; 
one in three Afghans are experiencing crisis or emergency 
level of food insecurity, and more than half of children 
under the age of five have faced acute malnutrition.3 
The current contraction of licit economic opportunities 
makes households even more vulnerable to engaging in 
illicit activities such as opium and cannabis cultivation, 
and heroin and methamphetamine manufacture and traf-
ficking. 
The evolution of the drug situation in Afghanistan will be 
influenced by factors including socioeconomic develop-
ment, interventions on drug demand and supply, and even-
tually by changes in national and international drug mar-
kets. 
The low level of opium prices observed in the last 3 years 
indicates that the international market of Afghan opiates 
is saturated for now, with little space to grow - unless 
more Afghan opiates are actively pushed into existing 
markets or new markets are established. The spike in 
prices observed after August is most likely due to a per-
ception of uncertainty as it is too sudden to suggest that it 
reflects a change in the international market. 
The methamphetamine market, however, is experiencing 
a global rise in demand. The largest markets in South-
East Asia and North America are growing, with signs of 
1 World Bank, “The World Bank in Afghanistan”, 8 October 2021, https://www.
worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview#1
2 UNDP, “97 per cent of Afghans could plunge into poverty by mid- 2022, says 
UNDP”, 9 September 2021, https://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/
en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2021/UNDP-press-release/
3 OCHA, “High-level ministerial meeting on the humanitarian situation in 
Afghanistan2021: Concept note”, 12 September 2021, https://www.unocha.
org/sites/unocha/files/20210912%20HLMM%20Afghanistan%202021_Con-
cept%20Note.pdf
expansion in the regions neighbouring Afghanistan.4 High 
demand may push an increase in methamphetamine 
manufacturing in Afghanistan. The fast-evolving market 
of synthetic drugs in the Russian Federation and Central 
Asia5 may also create conditions to expand methamphet-
amine manufacturing in Afghanistan to other synthetic 
drugs. 
Production and trafficking of opiates and synthetic drugs 
may evolve separately rather than substituting each other. 
In this case, they would pose two distincts threats. How-
ever, if they are managed by the same groups, the two 
drug markets could form a tight relationship. If demand 
declines for one drug, production of the other drug could 
be ramped up. This situation has been observed in South-
East Asia, where methamphetamine manufacture has 
expanded along with a contraction of opium production.
The current evidence on this type of relationship between 
opiates and methamphetamine is not definitive. On the 
production side, opium farming still seems to be carried 
out in different geographical areas to the collection and 
processing of the ephedra plant. But if methamphetamine 
manufacturers were to replace again the ephedra plant 
with synthetic precursors, they could easily shift their 
operations closer to opium production areas if it became 
more convenient. On the trafficking side, mixed seizures 
made outside Afghanistan suggest that some groups 
manage the trafficking of the two substances together 
at a certain point in the supply chain. This in turn sup-
ports the idea that they could drive an expansion of one 
drug market if drastic changes happen to the other. In 
such a situation, any decline in opium production could be 
accompanied by an increase in methamphetamine man-
ufacture. 
There is a precedent for the integration of drug markets 
in Afghanistan. Cannabis and opiate markets have shown 
highly correlated prices in the past, indicating that devel-
opments in one market affected the other.6 More recent 
price data suggests this link has weakened, although pres-
sure on one market may still encourage more activity in 
the other. In fact, the gross income from cannabis cultiva-
tion per hectare remains higher than for opium cultivation.
4 UNODC, World Drug Report 2021.
5 UNODC, World Drug Report 2021.
6 See UNODC/MCN cannabis cultivation survey 2012.
The evidence suggests that addressing the production 
problem in Afghanistan will require holistic interventions 
that tackle more than one drug, and take account of mar-
ket dynamics. Drastic reductions in drug output may not 
be sustainable and may trigger opposite results. A sud-
den decrease in opium cultivation after the 2001 opium 
ban led to a fourfold increase of average opium farm-gate 
prices, from $87 per kilogram in 2000 to $385 in 2002. 
This gave farmers a greater incentive to resume opium 
cultivation. 
While Afghanistan is central to global opiate produc-
tion, the country also has huge problems with drug use. 
Afghans face an increased risk of accelerated progression 
to drug use disorders when drug treatment options have 
been curtailed and may be further reduced.
Difficult socioeconomic conditions and wide availability 
of substances help to fuel domestic use. Decades of con-
flict and instability have left many Afghans vulnerable to 
mental health problems such as anxiety, depression, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) – all risk factors for 
drug use and drug use disorders.7 Drug use is known to 
affect people during their most productive years. Entrap-
ment of young people in Afghanistan in drug use and the 
illicit drug trade removes them from legitimate employ-
ment and education, posing barriers to the development 
of individuals and of society in general.8
7 Joel Swendsen and others, “Mental disorders as risk factors for substance 
use, abuse and dependence: results from the 10-year follow-up of the 
National Comorbidity Survey”, Addiction, (2010) vol 105, no 6, pp 1117-
1128.
8 Ibid.
